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Abstract. Deep neural network (DNN) verification is an emerging field, with   
diverse verification engines quickly becoming available. Demonstrating the ef-
fectiveness of these tools on real-world DNNs is an important step towards their 
wider adoption. We focus here on the recently proposed Marabou verification 
tool, and demonstrate its usage for a novel application: simplifying neural net-
works, by reducing the size of a DNN without harming its accuracy. We report 
on the workflow of the simplification process, and on its potential significance 
and applicability to domains of interest. 
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1 Introduction 
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are revolutionizing the way complex software is pro-
duced, obtaining unprecedented results in domains such as image recognition [1], nat-
ural language processing [2], game playing [3], and many others. There is now even a 
trend of using DNNs as controllers in autonomous cars and unmanned aircraft [4, 5]. 
With DNNs becoming prevalent, it is highly important to develop automatic techniques 
to assist in creating, maintaining and adjusting them. 
As DNNs are used in tackling increasingly complex tasks, their sizes (i.e., number 
of neurons) are also increasing – to a point where modern DNNs can have millions of 
neurons [6]. DNN size is thus becoming a liability, as deploying larger networks takes 
up more space, increases energy consumption, and prolongs response times. Conse-
quently, researchers have started working on DNN minimization and simplification. A 
common approach is to start with a large network, and reduce its size by removing some 
of its components (i.e., neurons and edges) [7,18]. The parts to be removed from the 
network are determined heuristically, and network accuracy may be harmed, sometimes 
requiring additional training after the simplification process has been performed [7].  
Here, we propose a novel simplification technique that harnesses recent advances in 
DNN verification [8-11,13-17,19-25]. Using verification queries, we propose to iden-
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tify components of the network that never affect its output. A major benefit of verifica-
tion-based simplification is that it is accurate, i.e. the simplified network is completely 
equivalent to the original. Thus, retraining of the simplified network, which may be 
expensive, is not required. Our technique can be applied using existing DNN verifica-
tion tools as a backend, and we report here on our experience using the recently pub-
lished Marabou framework [11]. We propose a work-flow in which we (1) perform 
lightweight simulations to identify parts of the network that are candidates for removal; 
(2) use Marabou to dispatch verification queries that determine which of those parts 
that can indeed be removed without affecting the network’s outputs; and (3) construct 
the simplified network, which is equivalent to the original. We evaluate our approach 
on the ACAS Xu family of DNNs for airborne collision avoidance in unmanned aircraft 
[5], and report a significant reduction of up to 10% in network sizes. 
2 Background: DNNs, Verification and Simplification 
DNNs are comprised of an input layer, an output layer, and multiple hidden layers in 
between. A layer is comprised of multiple nodes (neurons), each connected to nodes 
from the preceding layer using a predetermined set of weights (see Fig. 1). By assigning 
values to inputs and then feeding them forward through the network, values for each 
layer can be computed from the values of the previous layer, finally resulting in values 
for the outputs. 
 
 
Fig. 1. A small neural network with 2 hidden nodes in one hidden layer. Weights are denoted 
over the edges. Hidden node values are typically determined by computing a weighted sum ac-
cording to the weights, and then applying a non-linear activation function to the result. 
As DNNs are increasingly used in safety-critical applications [4, 5], there is a surge 
of interest in verification methods that can provide formal guarantees about DNN be-
havior [8-11,13-17,19-25]. A DNN verification query consists of a neural network and 
a property to be checked; and it results in either a formal guarantee that the network 
satisfies the property, or a concrete input for which the property is violated (a counter-
example). Verification queries can encode various properties about DNNs; e.g., that 
slight perturbations to a network’s inputs do not affect its output. Recently, there has 
been significant progress on DNN verification (see a recent survey [12]), although 
scalability remains a major limitation of existing approaches. It has been shown that the 
DNN verification problem is NP-complete, and becomes exponentially harder as the 
network size increases [8]. 
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In recent years, enormous DNNs have been appearing in order to tackle increasingly 
complex tasks – to a point where DNN size is becoming a liability, because large net-
works take longer to train and even to evaluate when deployed. Techniques for neural 
network minimization and simplification have thus started to emerge: typically, these 
take an initial, large network, and reduce its size by removing some of its components 
[7]. The pruning phase involves the removal of edges from the network. The selection 
of which edges to remove is done heuristically, often by selecting edges that have very 
small weights, because these edges are less likely to affect the network’s outputs sig-
nificantly. If all edges connecting a node to the preceding layer or to the succeeding 
layer are removed, then the node itself can be removed. After the pruning phase, the 
reduced network is retrained. This approach has been shown to produce a smaller net-
work whose performance is on par with that of the original network [7,18]. 
3 Simplification using Verification 
Despite the demonstrated usefulness of pruning-based DNN simplification [7,18], heu-
ristic-based approaches might sometimes miss edges that can be removed, if these 
edges do not have particularly small weights. However, such edges can be identified by 
a verification-based approach. For example, consider the small network shown in Fig. 
2. As all edges have weights with identical magnitudes, none of them would be pruned 
by a heuristic-based approach. However, using a verification engine, it is possible to 
check the property: “does there exist an input for which 𝑣𝑣4 takes a non-zero value?”. 
If the verification tool answers “no”, as is the case for the network in Fig. 2 (because 
𝑣𝑣4  =  𝑣𝑣2  −  𝑣𝑣3 and 𝑣𝑣2  =  𝑣𝑣3), then we are guaranteed that 𝑣𝑣4 is always assigned 0, 
regardless of the input. In turn, this means that 𝑣𝑣4 can never affect nodes in subsequent 
layers. In this case, 𝑣𝑣4 and all its edges can be safely removed from the network (ren-
dering the network’s output constant). Due to the soundness of the verification process, 
we are guaranteed that the simplified DNN is completely equivalent to the original 
DNN, and thus no retraining is required. 
 
Fig. 2. Using verification, node 𝑣𝑣4 can safely be removed from the network. 
The approach of using verification to identify nodes that are always assigned 0 for 
every possible input and can be safely removed is the core of our technique. However, 
because verification is costly, posing this query for every node of the DNN might take 
a long time. To mitigate this difficulty, we propose the following work-flow: 
 
1. Use lightweight simulations to identify nodes that are candidates for removal. 
Initially, all hidden nodes are such candidates. We then evaluate the network for 
random input values, and remove from the list of candidates any hidden node 
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that is assigned a non-zero value for some input. With each simulation, the num-
ber of candidates for removal decreases.  
2. For each remaining candidate node 𝑣𝑣, we create a separate verification query 
stating that 𝑣𝑣 ≠ 0, and use the underlying verification engine to dispatch it. If 
we get an UNSAT answer, we mark node 𝑣𝑣 for removal. The candidates are 
explored in a layer-by-layer order, which allows us to only examine a part of the 
DNN for every query. For example, when addressing a candidate in layer #2, 
we do not encode layers #3 and on as part of our verification query, because a 
node’s assignment can only be affected by nodes in preceding layers. Because 
verifying smaller networks is generally easier, this layer-by-layer approach ac-
celerates the process as a whole. In addition, this process naturally lends itself 
to parallelization, by running each verification query on a separate machine. 
3. Finally, we construct the simplified network, in which the nodes marked for re-
moval and all their incoming and outgoing edges are deleted. We can also re-
move any nodes that subsequently become irrelevant due to the removal of all 
of their incoming or outgoing edges (e.g., for the DNN in Fig. 2, after removing 
𝑣𝑣4 we can also remove 𝑣𝑣2 and 𝑣𝑣3, as neither has any remaining outgoing edges.) 
 
We note that our technique can be extended to simplify DNNs in additional ways, 
by using different verification queries. For example, it can identify separate nodes that 
are always assigned identical values (duplicates) and unify them, thus reducing the 
overall number of nodes. It can also identify (and remove) nodes that can be expressed 
as linear combinations of other nodes.  
4 Evaluation 
Our approach is general, in two senses: (1) it can be applied to simplify any DNN, 
regardless of its application domain; and (2) it can use any DNN verification engine as 
a backend, thus benefiting from any future improvement in verification technology. In 
practice, it is required that the DNN in question be supported by the backend verifica-
tion engine – for example, some engines may not support certain network topologies. 
For our evaluation here, we focused on the ACAS Xu family of 45 DNNs for airborne 
collision avoidance [5], and on the Marabou DNN verification tool [11]. Our code will 
be made publicly available with the final version of this paper. 
For each of the 45 DNNs, we ran a simple script, external to Marabou, to perform 
step (1) of our work-flow (random simulations), resulting in a list of candidate nodes 
for removal. For each of the ACAS Xu DNNs we performed 20000 simulations, and 
this narrowed down the list of nodes that are candidates for removal to about 7% of all 
hidden nodes (see Fig. 3). For step (2), we ran another script that takes as input a DNN 
and a node 𝑣𝑣 that is a candidate for removal, and constructs a smaller DNN, where that 
node is the only output node (subsequent layers are omitted). These pairs of modified 
DNNs and nodes are then passed to the Marabou framework, with the query 𝑣𝑣 ≠ 0. 
Here, we encountered the following issue: the Marabou framework, like many linear-
programming based tools, does not provide a way to directly specify that 𝑣𝑣 ≠ 0, but 
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rather only to state that 𝑣𝑣 ≥ 𝜖𝜖 for some 𝜖𝜖 > 0 (we assume all hidden nodes are, by 
definition, never negative, which is the case for the ACAS Xu DNNs). We experi-
mented with various values of 𝜖𝜖 (see Fig. 4), and concluded that the choice of 𝜖𝜖 has 
very little effect on the outcome of the experiment – i.e., nodes tend to either be obso-
lete, or take on large values. Finally, for step (3), we ran yet another script that uses the 
results of the previous steps to construct the simplified network.  
 
Fig. 3. Using simulation to identify nodes that are candidates for removal, on one of the ACAS 
Xu networks. 
 
Fig. 4. Number of removed nodes as a function of the value of 𝜖𝜖, on one of the ACAS Xu net-
works. The minor differences are the result of different queries timing out for different values 
of 𝜖𝜖. 
We performed this process for each of the 45 ACAS Xu networks. We ran the ex-
periments on machines with Intel Xeon E5-2670 CPUs (2.60GHz) and 8GB of 
memory, and used 𝜖𝜖 = 0.01. Each verification query was given a 4-hour timeout. Out 
of 1069 verification queries (1 per candidate node), 535 were UNSAT (node marked 
for removal), 15 were SAT, and 519 timed out (nodes not marked for removal).  
Thus, on average, 4% of the nodes were marked for removal (535 nodes out of 13500). 
Fig. 5 depicts their distribution across the 45 DNNs. In most networks, between 11 and 
15 nodes (out of 300) could be removed; but for a few networks, this number was 
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 10 100 1000 10000N
um
be
r o
f C
an
di
da
te
 N
od
es
Number of Simulations (logscale)
1
6
11
16
0.00001 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1Nu
m
be
r o
f r
em
ov
ed
 
no
de
s
Value of ε
6 
higher. For one of the networks we discovered 29 neurons that could be removed – 
approximately 10% of that network’s total number of neurons. 
 
Fig. 5. Total number of removed nodes of ACAS Xu networks. 
In a separate experiment, we used a similar technique to identify pairs of neurons 
that are always assigned identical values, so that they can be merged. We followed the 
same general framework: lightweight simulation to identify pairs of neurons that are 
candidates for merging, followed by verification queries to check the equivalence of 
each pair. Here, we were unable to find any pairs suitable for merging. Recall that neu-
ron comparison is performed using some small 𝜖𝜖 tolerance (0.01 in our experiment). It 
will be interesting to repeat the experiment using larger 𝜖𝜖 values, which will necessarily 
lead to some neuron pairs being suitable for merging. We plan to use verification to 
bound the overall change on the networks’ outputs in these cases, creating a trade-off: 
a user will be able to specify an acceptable threshold of change to the DNN’s outputs, 
and this will dictate which neurons can be merged. We leave this, and also the use of 
more complex queries (e.g., to identify nodes that can be expressed as linear combina-
tions of other nodes) for future work. 
5 Conclusion 
DNN verification is an emerging field, and we are just now beginning to tap its potential 
in assisting engineers in DNN development. We explored here a new application: using 
black-box verification engines to simplify neural networks. We demonstrated that sim-
plification is straightforward to achieve using a few simple scripts to wrap a verification 
engine, and that it can lead to substantial reduction in DNN size.  
In the future, we plan to extend this work along several axes. First, we intend to 
explore additional verification queries, which would allow to simplify DNNs in more 
sophisticated ways – for example by revealing that some neurons can be expressed as 
linear combinations of other neurons. In addition, we plan to investigate more aggres-
sive simplification steps, which may change the DNN’s output, while using verification 
to ensure that these changes remain within acceptable bounds. Finally, we intend to 
apply the technique to additional real-world DNNs and case studies. 
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